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Diverging Trends in the Socialist Constitutionalism of the People’s Republic of 
China and Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
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*
 
The University of Hong Kong 
 
I. Introduction 
The People’s Republic of China and Socialist Republic of Vietnam are probably 
the best reference points for each other in comparative studies of socialist 
constitutionalism, not just for their extensive similarities, but also their growing 
differences. For at least a decade, and especially since 2011,
1
 the two East Asian 
Party-states have been pursuing increasingly distinct paths towards the future. 
Although history records that Vietnam has taken important governance cues from 
China for centuries,
2
 a discernable pattern exists whereby some of Vietnam’s more 
independent moves occur during periods of tension with its neighbor to the north.
3
 
We seem to be at such a geopolitically-inspired crossroads right now, as China 
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1
 We assert that China has been growing more insular since the 18th Party Congress in 2012, while 
Vietnam has been trending more open since its 11
th
 Party Congress in 2011. 
   
2
 China dominated Vietnam for much of the period from 112 BC to 939AD, and the Chinese 
influence continued with varying intensity to the present era. For example, the 19
th
 Century Nguyen 
Dynasty’s Gia Long Code was heavily based on the Qing Code. Later, Chinese advisers shaped the 
stance of the Communist Party of Indochina during the 1940s. See John Gillespie and Albert Chen, 
Legal Reforms in China and Vietnam: A Comparison of Asian Communist Regimes (Routledge Press, 
2010), various historical notes compiled from pages 3-6; see also Dosch & Vuving, The Impact of 
China on Governance Structures in Vietnam (Bonn: German Development Institute, 2008). 
   
3
 Vietnam, like China, attempted a near-wholesale importation of the Soviet political-legal system, 
but remained closer to Moscow upon the Sino-Soviet split in 1968. Relations deteriorated as the 
countries fought a border war in 1979. Deference reappeared in the mid-1980s as Vietnam’s doi moi 
reforms aligned Vietnam with China’s reform policies, but the Vietnamese counterbalanced that with 
more internationalist initatives after 1989, as many major laws were borrowed from or inspired by 
multilateral institutions in the 1990s. Id. (Gillespie and Chen) pp. 7-8. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3010724 
pursues aggressive territorial claims in waters off the Vietnam coast.
4
  
Despite of their significant differences in size, population, and economic scale, the 
two systems invite comparison because they share common cultural (Confucian)
5
 and 
political (Soviet)
6
 origins. Both state apparatuses are subordinate to the leadership of 
a communist party whose supremacy is entrenched in the national constitution. Both 
claim to be committed to building a socialist rule of law that offers protection of 
human rights, although the substance differs greatly from Western expectations.
7
 
Both have been experiencing rapid socioeconomic transformations after liberalizing 
policies under the banner of developing a socialist market economy.
8
  
                                                     
   
4
 Whereas the Preamble of the Vietnamese Constitution of 1992 twice thanked “the precious 
assistance of friends across the world, especially of the socialist and neighboring countries” (emphasis 
added) in achieving revolutionary victories, the “especially” clause was dropped from the new 
Constitution of 2013. Similar language was removed from new Article 12 (old Article 14) describing 
the substantive bases of Vietnam’s foreign policy. Indeed, the HYSY 981 oil-rig incident invited 
speculation that Vietnam will revisit its “Three Nos” defense policy (i.e., having no formal military 
alliances, not allowing any foreign military bases on Vietnamese territory, and not relying on other 
countries in combat operations). See Ankit Panda, “After HYSY-981: A U.S.-Vietnam Alliance?” The 
Diplomat, 22 July 2014, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/after-hysy-981 
-a-u-s-vietnam-alliance/ (last visited 16 Oct 2015).  
   
5
 Bui Ngoc Son, “The Confucian Foundations of Ho Chi Minh’s Vision of Government,” Journal 
of Oriental Studies 46 (1) (2013): 35-59 (co-published by University of Hong Kong and Stanford 
University). 
   
6
 The Preamble of the 1982 Constitution explicitly entrenches the leadership of the CCP and, 
according to Article 1, China remains a socialist country practicing “democratic dictatorship” based on 
the alliance of workers and peasants. The Preamble of the 2013 Vietnamese Constitution notes the 
leadership of the VCP, while Article 4 declares that the VCP, “acting upon the Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine and Ho Chi Minh's thought, is the leading force of the State and society.” 2013 Vietnam 
Constitution, translation available at http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/tranlation_of_ 
vietnams_new_constitution_enuk_2.pdf (last visited 16 Oct 2015). 
   
7
 See, e.g., Albert H.Y. Chen, “Conclusion: Comparative reflections on human rights in Asia,” in 
Randall Peerenboom et al. (eds.), Human Rights in Asia (London: Routledge, 2006); Sonya Sceats and 
Shaun Breslin, “China’s Indirect Impact on the International Human Rights System,” in China and the 
International Human Rights System, Chp. 5, pp. 41-45 (London: Chatham House, 2012); “Human 
Rights Watch World Report: Vietnam 2013,” available at 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/vietnam (last visited 17 Oct 2015). 
   
8
 Both are middle income countries, although China is at the higher-middle end of the per capita 
income scale (USD 7,589) while Vietnam is at the lower-middle end (USD 2052). In terms of GDP per 
capita (nominal), China ranked 78/184 in 2014 with USD 7,589 per capita; and Vietnam’s was USD 
2,052, ranked 132/184. To put this in perspective, Vietnam in 2014 was where China was in 2006. IMF 
ranking available at http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/compare?country 
=cn#country=cn:vnm (last visited 16 Oct 2015). 
Meanwhile, the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Index 
(HDI) provides another apt comparison. In 2013, China was ranked as a high development country 
with a HDI score of .719, while Vietnam was a middle development country with a score of .638. Once 
again, Vietnam in 2013 was about where China was in 2004/2005 in terms of HDI. UNDP HDI Index 
Noting these similarities, several comparative studies have been undertaken in 
recent years,
9
 but the field lies outside the mainstream of international constitutional 
discourse and is therefore still open to development. Conventional liberal criticism of 
constitutional law studies regarding Leninist states is that those orders lack 
constitutionalism, i.e., the text does not outline and establish a system that functions 
to constrain the real political power of (or behind) the state, especially through an 
independent judiciary.
10
 Thus described, the constitution’s only operative provisions 
are the decrees justifying the exercise of absolute political power by the ruling party; 
all other provisions – especially those involving individual liberties – are merely 
irrelevant “window dressing.”11 If true, the Chinese and Vietnamese constitutions are 
ineffective and inconsequential. Yet these critiques cannot explain why such 
meaningless constitutional provisions are robustly debated and frequently resorted to, 
with varying degrees of effectiveness, by aggrieved parties both through the courts 
and on the streets, as discussed below.   
Many argue that socialist constitutions are, at least, aspirational,
12
 and history 
demonstrates that once inspired there is little the peoples of China or Vietnam cannot 
                                                                                                                                                        
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi (last visited 16 Oct 2015). 
   
9
 See, for example, Gillespie and Chen, Legal Reforms in China and Vietnam: A Comparison of 
Asian Communist Regimes (Routledge Law in Asia, 2010); John Gillespie and Pip Nicholson, Asian 
Socialism and Legal Change: The Dynamics of Vietnamese and Chinese Reform. (Canberra: Asia 
Pacific Press, 2005); Bui Ncqc Son, “The Discourse of Constitutional Review in Vietnam” 9 Journal of 
Comparative Law 175-205; Mark Sidel, Law and Society in Vietnam: The Transition from Socialism in 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2008); Dosch & Vuving, The Impact of China 
on Governance Structures in Vietnam (Bonn: German Development Institute, 2008). 
   
10
 Albert H.Y. Chen, “The Achievement of Constitutionalism in Asia: Moving Beyond 
‘Constitution without Constitutionalism,” in Constitutionalism in Asia in the Early Twenty-First 
Century (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
   
11
 Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China, 3
rd
 Ed. (Parlgrave Macmillian, 2010), 148.  
   
12
 This characterization has been around for many years. See, for example, The Constitutions of the 
Communist World, William B. Simons (ed.), (Germantown, MD, USA: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 
xv: “The constitutions of the communist world have always been used for internal as well as external 
consumption – to proclaim what has been achieved and to lay down the program of what is still to be 
accomplished.” He Weifang, Stephanie Balme and Michael Dowdle, among others, point out that a 
significant part of the 1982 Chinese Constitution declares goals to be achieved in the future, including a 
system of democratic political representation as well as a wide range of political, social and economic 
rights. Balme and Dowdle refer to China’s constitutionalism as “development potential, not 
developmental accomplishment,” in Building Constitutionalism in China (Palgrave, 2010), 10.  
achieve. The Party-states, having codified normative rights, face credibility crises if 
they violate the peoples’ expectations by ignoring those undertakings for too long. 
Indeed, constitutional interpretation, enforcement, and/or reform sometimes 
legitimately occur through alternative processes known as either “political 
constitutionalism” (wherein political mechanisms such as legislative processes 
assume and manage constitutional enforcement),
13
 or “popular” or “civic” 
constitutionalism (wherein citizens spontaneously assert ownership over 
constitutional interpretation and compel a dialogue and a settlement with the state on 
matters relating to constitutional rights).
14
 While the former can be used to capture 
popular demands within the authoritarian system, the latter may be more worrisome to 
authoritarian rulers, as the spontaneous demand for constitutional rights is “gain[ing] 
new cohesion and momentum,”15 demonstrating a nascent constitutional awareness 
among the public outside of the Party-states’ master plan.16 Inspired citizens are 
increasingly usurping judicial roles by interpreting and implementing constitutional 
rights through online mobilizations, peaceful vigils, religious ceremonies, labor 
                                                     
   
13
 See Chen Duanhong, “The People Must be Present” (Ren Min Bi Dei Chu Chang), in 
Constituent Power and Fundamental Law (Zhi Xian Quan Yu Gen Ben Fa), (Beijing: China Legal 
Publishing House), 46-110; Jiang Shigong (2010) “Written and Unwritten Constitution: A New 
Approach to the Study of Constitutional Government in China,” Modern China 36(1): 12-46. 
   
14
 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Harvard University Press, 1993); John E. Finn, 
“The Civic Constitution: Some Preliminaries” in Barber and George (eds.) Constitutional Politics: 
Essays on Constitution Making, Maintenance, and Change (Princeton University Press, 2001), 44; 
Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford 
University Press, 2004); Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defense of the 
Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Bui Ngoc Son and Pip Nicholson, 
Activism and Popular Constitutionalism in Contemporary Vietnam, Law & Social Inquiry Law (2016); 
and Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 991 (2006); 
Zhang Qianfan, A Constitution without Constitutionalism? The Paths of Constitutional Development in 
China, 8:4 Int’l J. of Constitutional Law 950 (2010). 
   
15
 Hand, Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary China, 7 U. Penn East Asia L. Rev 51 
(2011), 65-6.   
   
16
 See Stephanie Balme, “China’s Constitutional Research and Teaching: A State of the Art,” in 
Building Constitutionalism in China (Stephanie Balme and Michael W. Dowdle eds., 2009), 107; Hand, 
“Citizens Engage the Constitution: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Constitutional Review Proposals in 
the People’s Republic of China,” Id. at 221. See also Stephanie Balme, The Judicialisation of Politics 
and the Politicisation of the Judicary (1978-2005), 5 Global Jurist Frontiers 1 (2005); Randall 
Peerenboom, Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy: Problem or Paradigm?, 19 Colum. 
J. Asian L. 185, 204 (2005). 
strikes and street actions.
17
 Such resilient demands have made constitutional 
supremacy a subject of lively debate,
18
 with the positive potential of generating more 
healthy dialogue between Party-state and society. Indeed, a diverse range of legal and 
accommodative approaches are now being deployed.
19
 As such, if constitutional 
studies concern the distribution and exercise of political power, then research on the 
Chinese and Vietnamese constitutions must venture into a “results-oriented pragmatic 
approach.” 20  The failure to explore such avenues is fatal to an academic 
understanding of different national governance schemes, comparative scholarship 
generally and, specifically, to the aspirations of citizens and reformers in socialist 
states who seek to develop ties to mainstream constitutional discourse. 
This chapter provides an overview to comparative study of Sino-Vietnamese 
comparative constitutionalism by exploring the bases of three core, substantive pillars 
of socialist constitutionalism through the Sino-Vietnamese comparison: insistence on 
Party leadership, reliance on socialist rule of law, and adaptation to populism. After 
considering several examples of how constitutional rules are currently operating 
through political and popular constitutionalism in all three areas, we conclude that 
Vietnam is presently moving in a direction offering more prospects for convergence 
with international norms,
21
 as the current Vietnamese Party-state is relatively less 
                                                     
   
17
 Hand, Resolving Constitutional Disputes, at 92, also citing Carl Minzner, Xinfang: Alternative to 
Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 Stan. J. Int’l L. 103, 143–45 (2006). 
   
18
 Of course, both China and Vietnam make the controversial assertion that their national 
constitutions are the supreme law of the land (1982 Chinese Constitution, Art. 5; 2013 Vietnamese 
Constitution, Arts. 4, 8, 9), but the lack of rigorous judicial enforcement does not necessarily mean the 
constitution is an empty letter.  
   
19
 Judicial enforcement is obviously preferable as it is more transparent, structured and formal; 
political and popular constitutionalism are both characterized by opacity and informal trade-offs, while 
popular constitutionalism can be informal or occasionally chaotic. See, for example, Keith Hand, 
“Constitutionalizing Wukan: The Value of the Constitution outside the Courtroom,” 12:3 China Brief 
(Feb 2012); Carl Minzner, Xinfang: Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 Stan. J. Int’l L. 
103, 143–45 (2006). 
   
20
 Peerenboom, The Social Foundations of China’s Living Constitution (2010), 41. 
   
21
 Some institutional limits on this flirtation are evaluated by Thiem Bui, Liberal Constitutionalism 
and the Socialist State in an Era of Globalization: An Inquiry into Vietnam’s Constitutional Discourse 
and Power Structures, 5 The Global Studies Journal 2 (2013). 
politically monolithic, more open to the influence of international laws, and more 
tolerant of civil society than its Chinese counterpart. That being the case, we predict 
that Vietnam will likely continue to depart from the increasingly insular Chinese 
model of constitutional development for the foreseeable future.  
 
II. Leadership of the Communist Parties 
At a foundational level, there have been few structural changes to the authoritarian 
Chinese and Vietnamese Party-state constitutional orders in spite of the pervasive 
social and economic reforms of the last three decades. With the exception of the first 
Vietnamese Constitution of 1946,
22
 all of China and Vietnam’s post-revolution 
constitutions (each of which has had five) have enshrined Leninist political 
supervision. Party leadership is a prime directive consistently entrenched in both the 
Chinese and Vietnamese national constitutions, clearly declared in their respective 
Preambles and core text.
23
 The respective Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the 
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) monopolize political and military power,
24
 
institutionalize democratic centralism, and prohibit threatening discourse.  
Though Party leadership cannot be changed through any legal means, the 
organization of that power takes significantly different expressions in China and 
Vietnam. While decisive and effective implementation characterizes both orders, the 
                                                     
   
22
 Perhaps this is because that 1946 Constitution represented a synthesis of Western and Ho Chi 
Minh Thought, calling for a tripartite separate of powers and guaranteeing fundamental rights. David G 
Marr, Ho Chi Minh’s Independence Declaration, in Essays into Vietnamese Pasts (K W Taylor and 
John K. Whitmore eds.) (Connell University Press, 1995), pp. 221-231.     
   
23
 Supra note 4. 
   
24
 Article 4 of the Vietnam Constitution (2013) makes the party the vanguard and representative 
not only of the Vietnamese working class, but of the whole Vietnamese people and nation, further 
narrowing the legal space to exercise the right to pluralistic and freely contested elections. Article 65 
follows the government lead in enshrining a new legal requirement for Vietnam’s armed forces to be 
absolutely loyal to the Communist Party. 
Vietnamese Party-state is presently more open to constructive debate within the party 
forum, as evinced by having more diffuse executive authorities and a more 
competitive selection process for membership in its Central Committee.  
Indeed, both nations feature a Party-state that operates on the basis of democratic 
centralism. This ensures a decisive decision-making process, thus establishing 
“effective” states in which policy-making and implementation is swift, owing in part 
to a denial of separation of powers and a lack of mechanisms through which formal 
checks-and-balances can be exercised.
25
 While these structural deficiencies 
perpetuate other systemic problems, they need not undercut raw “government 
effectiveness” which – as defined by international institutions – simply measures 
whether a regime can implement meaningful change.
26
 Fukuyama forcefully argues 
that state effectiveness is a necessary condition for successful constitutional and legal 
reform, as strong leaders in the Confucian tradition are well positioned for 
nation-building, demonstrated by the cases of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and 
Singapore.
27
 Once there is the political will to promote reform, effective states have 
strong institutions to rely upon and competent bureaucrats to implement programs 
with a high degree of efficiency.
28
 Accepting that both states have high 
implementation capacity,
29
 the questions becomes those of political values and will. 
                                                     
   
25
 As the 2014 Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Promoting the 
Rule of Law (Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de 
jueding) explains, China will not admit any separation of powers and will not tolerate any institution to 
have a veto on the Party’s decisions. English translation and Chinese original available at 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concernin
g-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-for
ward/ (last visited 17 Oct 2015).  
   
26
 The World Bank provides this definition: “Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies.”  
   
27
 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the 
Globalisation of Democracy (Profile Books, 2014). 
   
28
 “Regardless of the degree of government intervention, the fast-growing economies of East Asia 
share a common feature: they all possess competent, high-capacity state.” Id. at 335. 
   
29
 For instance, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) index measures 
It is perhaps on those bases that several meaningful and consequential differences 
between the political designs of the two Party-states is emerging. Since the events of 
1989, the CCP has since demonstrated a much higher level of concentration of 
political power in the hands of a smaller number of men, while the VCP has 
demonstrated signs of political diffusion, splitting into contesting blocs. As a result, 
the nascent checks-and-balances within the Vietnamese system are more apparent. 
Former Chinese President Hu Jintao found the trend so disturbing that he felt 
compelled to issue an internal Party document: 
. . . criticiz[ing] the Vietnamese authorities for moving “too quickly toward 
inner-party democracy,” even warning that a destabilizing Mikhail 
Gorbachev-like figure could come to power. The CCP also banned public 
discussion of Vietnam’s reforms, deploying party intellectuals to argue 
publicly against such a political development in China.
30
 
That fear likely emanates from the fact that developments in Vietnam indicate the 
emergence of more political constitutionalism, as there is more intra-party democracy 
in the VCP than the CCP. 
At the level of elite politics, the commanding heights of Vietnam’s Party-state 
feature a broader policy-making coalition involving more diverse stakeholders in the 
decision-making process.
31
 This is true in both the executive and legislative arenas. 
                                                                                                                                                        
governance ability via six indicators: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of 
violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. China 
and Vietnam performed the best in government effectiveness among the six indicators in the 2014 
survey. Importantly, China outperformed its “East Asian and Pacific” neighbors in “government 
effectiveness” while lagging behind in the other five indicators, while Vietnam closely tracked the 
regional averages. As a lower-middle income country, Vietnam clearly outperformed other similarly 
situated countries in terms of both “political stability” and “government effectiveness.” These assets 
generate confidence and legitimacy in the durability of the system and hope for its capacity to improve. 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, Government Effectiveness, available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc (last visited 17 Oct. 2015).   
   
30
 Regina Abrami, Edmund Malesky and Yu Zheng, “Vietnam through Chinese Eyes: Divergent 
Accountability in Single-Party Regimes,” citing Gu Sanyue, “Yuenan chule ge ‘Deng Xiaoping’” 
(“There is a Deng Xiaoping in Vietnam”), Blog China, Dec 2006, available at 
http://vip.bokee.com/article.php?id=197040 (last visited 11 May 2007), in Martin K. Dimitrov, 
“Understanding Communist Collapse and Resilience,” Why Communism Did Not Collapse: 
Understanding Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe, (Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 238. 
   
31
 Edmund Malesky, Regina Abrami and Yu Zheng, Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party 
Speaking of the executives first, China has endowed its supreme leader with a “trinity” 
of positions that unify command of the Party-State: President of the State, General 
Secretary of the CCP, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. That makes the 
office-holder, now Xi Jinping, incredibly powerful. Meanwhile, in Vietnam, the posts 
are separate: the Prime Minister is Nguyễn Tấn Dũng, the General Secretary is 
Nguyễn Phú Trọng, and the Commander-in-Chief is also the President of Vietnam, 
currently Trương Tấn Sang. Political observers indicate that those three individuals 
represent different political factions within the VCP, perhaps as the result of a grand 
bargain. Prime Minister Dung is portrayed as a pro-Western reformer, President Sang 
a pro-reform moderate, and Party Secretary Trong a conservative, pro-Chinese hand.
32
 
Power is also more diffuse throughout the legislative organs of the Vietnamese 
Party-state. For example, the ultimate political power in China rests in the CCP 
Politburo (25) and especially its Standing Committee (currently 7 members, down 
from 9 in 2013), with the Central Committee (205 full members and 171 alternate 
members) playing only a ceremonial role.
33
 Adding the 2987 representatives of the 
National People’s Congress, that is a total of roughly 3395 representatives for 1.3 
billion people, each representing 435,000 souls. Meanwhile, in Vietnam, the 
150-strong VCP Central Committee has been grappling for power with the smaller 
Standing Committee (15), while the state’s National Assembly contains 498 members. 
That amounts to roughly 660 people presiding over 90 million souls, or one 
representative for every 136,000.  
The VCP’s broader Central Committee has been a relevant decision-maker since 
                                                                                                                                                        
Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China, 43:4 Comparative Politics 409 (July 2011). 
   
32
 http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/vietnam-after-2016-who-will-lead/ 
   
33
 18
th
 Communist Party of China Central Committee [Zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie 
zhongyang weiyuanhui] available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2012-11/15/c_123854387.htm 
(last visited 17 Oct. 2015). 
the demise of General Secretary Le Duan in 1986, with some claiming that it is 
superior to a Standing Committee that has been reduced to “a glorified secretariat.”34 
Indeed, that Central Committee has grabbed attention for an ability, though rarely 
manifested, to reject recommendations on significant political decisions from the 
Politburo.
35
 The Central Committee’s apparent power was demonstrated in October 
2012, when it reversed a Politburo decision initiated by General Secretary Trong to 
discipline Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung for economic mismanagement and 
nepotism.
36
 It next rejected Trong’s recommendation of two persons to the Politburo 
in May 2013, opting for its own favored candidates.
37
 Another unprecedented vote of 
no confidence for 20 top party officials was overcome by Prime Minister Dung’s 
faction in the Central Committee in January 2015.
38
 Meanwhile, across the divide, 
senior members of the National Assembly have boldly criticized the Prime Minister,
39
 
while another proposed that Vietnam should adopt a bicameral legislature with the 
National Assembly serving as the lower house and the VCP’s Central Committee as 
the senate.
40
 While corruption, patronage and factional politics are common issue 
facing both the CCP and VCP, power is much more centralized in the CCP where 
political competition is much less visible.  
While what we know of these events clearly suggests significant internal power 
struggles, this broader coalition enables wider political participation and more fierce 
                                                     
   
34
 Malesky, Abrami and Zheng, Institutions and Inequality, supra note 31, at 13. 
   
35
 Id. (Malesky, Abrami and Zheng) 
   
36
 http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/vietnam-after-2016-who-will-lead/ 
   
37
 Le Hong Hiep, “Power Shifts in Vietnam’s Political System,” East Asia Forum, 5 Mar. 2015, 
available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/03/05/power-shifts-in-vietnams-political-system/ (last 
visited 15 Oct. 2015).  
38
 Votes in June 2013, November 2014, and January 2015, respectively, See 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-15/vietnam-confidence-vote-reveals-jockeying-amo
ng-political-elite 
  
39
 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20322830 
   
40
 Le Hong Hiep, “Power Shifts in Vietnam’s Political System,” East Asia Forum, 5 Mar. 2015, 
available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/03/05/power-shifts-in-vietnams-political-system/ (last 
visited 15 Oct. 2015).  
competition for power in Vietnam than in China. There is, for example, no formal, 
competitive procedure for joining Politburo or the Standing Committee in China, and 
the rejection rate of nominees to the ceremonial Central Committee is only between 4 
to 8 percent. In Vietnam, on the contrary, the gap between nominated candidates and 
elected members in the Central Committee is 23% for full members and 54% for 
alternate members.
41
 A larger circle of decision-makers composed of more 
representative competing factions could produce different political consequences,  
one of which being that the political process in Vietnam appears relatively more open, 
more representative of diverse interests, and potentially more accountable to the larger 
society.  
Vietnam’s broader political participation and more fierce political competition 
make the VCP more accountable, both horizontally and vertically, than the CCP.
42
 
Political pluralism at the elite level has had a cascade impact in making the 
atmosphere surrounding legal processes more transparent. There has been more 
competition between the Party and the state, and disagreements among different state 
organizations can be openly manifested. In a famous case, the Vietnamese police 
promulgated a “one person, one motorcycle” policy, and following that policy, the 
Hanoi government suspended registration of motorcycles in some of the city’s 
districts.
43
 The restriction inspired deep hostility and resistance among Vietnam’s 
motorcycle users, leading to fierce social mobilization and public debate over 
constitutional property rights. The Hanoi government and the police held their ground, 
but the Ministry of Justice and National Assembly eventually threatened legal 
                                                     
   
41
 Malesky, Abrami and Zheng, Institutions and Inequality, supra note 31, at 17.  
   
42
 Martin K. Dimitrov, “Understanding Communist Collapse and Resilience,” Why Communism 
Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 32. 
   
43
 Bui Ngoc Son “Constitutional Developments in Vietnam in the First Decade of the 21st Century,” 
in Albert H.Y. Chen, Constitutionalism in Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 206-07. 
challenges, forcing them to back off.
44
  
In contrast, CCP elites are more monopolistic and retain more extensive and 
institutionalized control over state apparatuses, even overriding state organs in 
making and implementing decisions. The CCP is deeply embedded in government 
departments and exercises routine political control of state institutions and public 
authorities.
45
 It relies on informal institutions under the control of the Party known as 
“small leading groups” which cut across any perceived boundary between Party and 
State.
46
 These CCP cells play a key role in decision-making within Chinese state 
organs and are increasingly asserting political control in private sector law firms, 
accounting firms, and NGOs.
47
 
There also appears to be a stronger political will for and deeper commitment to 
structural reform in Vietnam. After a fierce debate, the Vietnamese chose to ratify a 
new constitution in 2013, rather than amend the old. During the debates, the National 
Assembly took a strong position in supporting a proposed Constitutional Council.
48
 
Prior to the abrupt final decision not to adopt it, elements of Vietnamese society 
undertook a rich discussion of constitutional review that advanced the concept of 
building such an independent constitutional adjudication forum quite far.
49
 To date, 
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 Id. “NA deputies' two-day discussion on draft amendments to the Constitution, which was 
the only known comparable example in China was for a retired Chief Justice to call 
for the creation of a similar institution at a quasi-official function,
50
 while the CCP 
largely associates such suggestions as heresies associated with color revolutions to be 
perpetrated by Western powers and their domestic agents.
51
 Indeed, whereas Vietnam 
appears to be liberalizing its perspective on consultation, input and debate since 2013, 
China has opted to go in the opposite direction, rendering the terms 
“constitutionalism,” “civil society,” and “judicial independence” (among others) taboo 
in academic discourse.
52
  
     Intriguingly, the Vietnamese are currently debating procedural rules both for 
holding public demonstrations and voting in referendums. The former is meant to 
actualize a limited and issue-specific freedom to assemble granted in Article 25, and 
has been boosted by recent nationalist sentiment against China.
53
 Of more structural 
interest, Article 29 grants the right to vote in a referendum to any person over 18 years 
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old in any referendum declared by the National Assembly (Article 70) and organized 
by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly (Article 74). Although there 
have not been any as of this date, the matter was warmly debated at a series of three 
conferences in 2015, including by legal academics and members of the Ho Chi Minh 
City bar association at a conference held at the Ho Chi Minh City University School 
of Law in June 2015.
54
 Though unlikely to be implemented in the near future, such a 
move would be a remarkable leap in socialist constitutional development. In terms of 
Vietnamese constitutional text, it would help promote the People’s mastery (Art. 2) 
and assist the VCP in developing “close ties with the People,” “submitting to People’s 
supervision,” and assure that the VCP is “accountable to the People in its decisions” 
(Art. 4[2]). 
     In any event, it is probable that the Central Committee will continue to 
aggregate power after the upcoming 12
th
 National Congress in 2016 if Dung ascends 
to Party Chairman and the Central Committee can defend and maintain its ability to 
conduct confidence votes on top party officials. In concert, these developments 
indicate that the VCP appears to be relatively more open-minded and pluralistic in its 
exercise of political power within its authoritarian context, rendering its current state 
of reform progress more “politically consequential” than that of China.55  
 
III. Commitment to Socialist Rule of Law 
 
Both China and Vietnam advocate the development of a so-called socialist rule of 
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law. Since shedding their totalitarian approaches decades ago, both Parties have been 
more reluctant to exercise naked political power. They instead resort to legal 
institutions to manage and coordinate massive socioeconomic transitions and maintain 
credibility. Legal reform in authoritarian states is a contradictory process, however, 
because it can generate tremendous societal demand for individual rights and 
government accountability. Thus, while the Party-states employ law to achieve certain 
objectives, they attempt to limit legal reform so as to prevent any political spillover. 
Vietnam’s experiment has been proceeding in a more internationalist fashion, however, 
as it has been more welcoming of foreign normative influences, especially in the field 
of human rights.  
What comprises socialist rule of law is the subject of much debate. Chinese and 
Vietnamese “socialism” appears very different from European “socialism.”56 What 
classifies the Chinese and Vietnamese orders as “socialist” perhaps more than 
anything else is their self-identification; what separates them most obviously from 
European models is their Leninist political structure. Leninism includes a doctrine 
positing that vanguard communist parties do not have an interest independent of that 
of the “People,” as they completely discern and represent their common interest. As 
Nathan put it, the Party asserts that it and the People “have a fundamental harmony of 
interests” which makes democracy and accountability redundant and potentially 
harmful.
57
 A fundamental change occurred upon the collapse of this doctrine in China 
and Vietnam during the period of economic reform, which was accompanied by the 
surfacing of diverse, pluralistic social interests. Having recognized the perennial 
existence of social conflict, the Parties must design rules and institutions to manage 
and preserve harmony. Both the CCP and the VCP have managed developments in 
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response to complex socioeconomic circumstances and, as a result, there have been 
visible expansions or contractions of constitutional “space.” 
The main thread of constitutional change has been an emphasis on the rule of law 
and individual rights in promoting social and economic development. In China, 
significant constitutional amendments include the recognition of the privately-owned 
economy in 1988, the promotion of rule of law and construction of a socialist state of 
rule of law in 1999, and the duty of state to respect human rights in 2004.
58
 The CCP 
Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum in 2014 recommitted China to further 
development of a socialist rule of law system.
59 The new Vietnamese Constitution of 
2013 contains significantly more phrasing of substantive rights than before. 
Meanwhile, legal reform in both countries has included an explosion of legislation, 
the professionalization and institutionalization of legal institutions, a growing 
numbers of legal professionals to channel disputes from society to state institutions 
and, above all, an effort to inculcate a new popular legal culture.
60
   
Rule of law, in order to be credible in the eyes of the public, must be able to 
regularize, normalize, and discipline the exercise of power. The CCP and VCP have 
thus established self-limiting and self-correcting mechanisms, such as the 
strengthening of intra-Party anti-corruption enforcement,
61
 although the Chinese 
efforts have been much stronger in this regard. The Chinese central inspection system 
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was strengthened in 1990 and codified in the CCP Constitution at the 17th Party 
Congress in 2007, with a series of new measures being unveiled since, especially after 
a renewed anti-corruption drive began with the ascendancy of Xi Jinping in 2012.
62
 
Meanwhile, the Vietnamese issued a resolution on “urgent issues in Party building” at 
its fourth plenum of the 11th Party Conference in 2011, but elaboration has been 
relatively lacking, and a comprehensive “Law on the Party” proposal put forward by 
the Fatherland Front was rejected in 2013.
63
 The new 2013 Constitution did add two 
important stipulations to the old Article 4, however, declaring the accountability of the 
VCP to the people in its decision-making capacity as well as the subjugation of VCP 
members to the Constitution and the law.
64
 Incentives for such self-regulation exist 
despite the lack of an institutionalized system of checks-and-balances. Indeed, both 
countries appear to have reached a stage where their Party-states must figure out how 
to commit themselves to the rule of law systems they themselves created. This is not 
because of a serious and credible commitment to the rule of law on the part of the 
Party-state, but rather internal corruption scandals and a demand emanating from civil 
society to hold the Party-state accountable to its own rhetoric.  
The development of socialist rule of law in China and Vietnam differs from the 
liberal conception of rule of law in at least three other major respects: the prevalence 
of a statist stance in imposing legal norms and creating institutions, selective rights 
extension, and thin (versus thick) legal protections. In developing socialist rule of law, 
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China and Vietnam demonstrate unique characteristics strongly associated with their 
national cultures and ideological debates.
65
 Yet, by placing both countries in the 
larger historical and comparative context, Peerenboom argues that they have been 
following a fairly typical East Asian Model (EAM) of development despite their 
professed allegiance to communism.
66
 Thus, there are a number of similarities 
between the two countries in key areas of law reform and legal development. 
First, owing to their statist stances in imposing legal norms and creating 
institutions, both states prioritize the “supply side” of the rule of law and rights 
protection while managing a gradual shift to the demand side.
67
 The supply side 
includes establishing both constitutional and legal rules, and institutions (i.e., courts) 
to apply them.
68
 The demand side includes rights-awareness on the part of the 
citizens, as well as tolerance of lawyers and social organizations in channeling 
disputes into legal institutions that facilitate rights protection.
69
 It is to be expected at 
the beginning of a rule of law building process that rule-making, as a top-down 
process, has priority. After all, rules must be in existence before they can be enforced. 
Once promulgated, the issue becomes whether those rules actually are enforced or 
remain mere “window-dressing.”70 Therefore, the second stage of reform regards 
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institutional capacity-building.  
Both China and Vietnam have an adequate supply of baseline rules and 
institutions, but there seems to be insufficient channeling into dispute resolution 
fora.
71
 This weak channeling function appears to be a critical bottleneck in both 
efforts toward law reform, as it has been in the case other developing countries.
72
 As 
Epp argues, what distinguishes a weak legal system from a strong legal system is not 
rules or institutions, but what he refers to as the “support structure,” including the 
legal profession, legal aid, access to justice, NGOs, and other intermediaries that 
perform a channeling function.
73
 Both China and Vietnam are developing legal aid 
services, improving access to courts and other dispute resolution mechanisms, and 
otherwise strengthening the demand side of the rule of law but, at the same time, 
deeply worry about the political risk of increasing legal consciousness among the 
citizenry and at the same time placing the supply side of the legal system, the 
judiciary in particular, under the Party’s firm control.74  
Second, both Party-states are selective in terms of which rights they liberalize. 
Within limited political contexts, both demonstrate that it is possible for authoritarian 
states to respect some degree of personal freedom, individual rights, and rule of law. 
Indeed, the CCP has proven itself adaptable and resilient in the eyes of the general 
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public because of the promulgation and enforcement of a bundle of legal rights.
75
 
Meanwhile, the ratification of a new, more approachable 2013 constitution signals 
that Vietnam has the will and capacity to pursue more progressive changes. But, like 
other transitional states, both China and Vietnam prioritize rule of law and the 
protection of rights in selective policy areas depending on perceived necessity and 
feasibility. There is greater rule of law in matters of commerce than in media, religion, 
criminal law and other politically sensitive areas.
76
 It is therefore not surprising that 
Vietnamese constitutionalism was most forcefully asserted in the aforementioned 
motorcycle case,
77
 while the Chinese Supreme People’s Court chose to test the 
feasibility of constitutional review in a case regarding educational rights.
78
   
On the contrary, there are areas, such as anti-corruption and media governance, 
where formal law remains largely silent.
79
 A dualism exists wherein professional 
justice serves the vast majority of ordinary cases while politicized justice caters to a 
range of exceptional cases.
80
 That dualism causes a dilemma for the judiciary when 
facing cases of different political natures. For example, Chinese judges are totally 
supervised by political instructions in exceptional cases, but perhaps too independent 
                                                     
   
75
 See David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington DC, 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008).  
   
76
 During the 1990s, Vietnamese lawmakers borrowed or drew inspiration from laws multilateral 
international institutions such as the World Bank, including in drafting the 1993 Law on Business 
Bankruptcy, 1995 Civil Code, 1997 Commercial Law, and the 1999 Enterprise Law. Chen & Gillespie, 
8. 
   
77
 Bui Ngoc Son “Constitutional Developments in Vietnam in the First Decade of the 21st Century,” 
in Albert H.Y. Chen, Constitutionalism in Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 206-07. 
   
78
 Robert K. Morris, “China’s Marbury: Qi Yuling v. Chen Xiaoqi - The Once and Future Trial of 
Both Education and Constitutionalization,” 2 Tsinghua China Law Review 273-316 (2012).  
   
79
 Fu Hualing, “Wielding the Sword: President Xi’s New Anti-corruption Campaign,” Chapter 5 in 
Susan Rose-Ackerman and Paul Lagunes, Greed, Corruption, and the Modern State: Essays in Political 
Economy (Edward Elgar Publisher, 2015) 134-57. 
  
80
 Such as the high-profile trials of Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang and others in the current Xi Jinping 
anti-corruption campaign in China. Meanwhile, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung also 
declared anti-corruption a priority, establishing a new anti-corruption agency to be headed by the 
Deputy Prime Minister. A major corruption scandal within the Ministry of Transport in 2006 led to 
high-level resignations and arrests, including the Vice Minister of Transport. 
in other ordinary cases.
81
 Both China and Vietnam have been regularizing and 
professionalizing their court procedures,
82
 but such professionalism encounters 
insurmountable difficulties inherent to the political system.
83
 Dissident trials, which 
have become a regular practice in both countries, illustrate the pain of authoritarian 
states struggling with rule of law.  
Third, in both countries, the present state of reform promotes a thin/formal 
version of the rule of law without dealing with the hard questions posed by a 
thick/substantive rule of law. The thin version focuses on the internal qualities of law, 
such as the requirements that law must be public and accessible, generally applicable, 
and largely consistent.
84
 It also focuses on the institutional dimension of enforcement 
and requires valid rules for law-making, fair application, effective enforcement and 
general acceptance of rules.
85
 Critics who challenge the existence of a “thin” rule of 
law point out that it does not provide a normative foundation, and is not supported by 
the sort of rights-based system commonly observed in a liberal democracy.
86
 Indeed, 
legal reform in this context is largely illiberal in the sense that the legal system under 
construction is not rights-based. Instead, reform efforts have been concentrated on 
developing a system that better ensures certainty, clarity and, to some extent, 
procedural fairness. Such law reform is thus at improving government effectiveness 
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and enhancing state capacity.  
Despite these underlying similarities, China and Vietnam differ in interesting 
ways on their official commitment to and societal demand for the rule of law. Rhetoric 
praising rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution is more often relied upon in 
China by emerging political leaders when facing challenges from more established 
authorities. Once those leaders consolidate their power, however, rule of law and 
constitutionalism typically become less relevant.
87
 Vietnam, because of broader 
participation and more fierce competition among different factions, may depend more 
upon rule of law as a fundamental code of the political game. This – and the apparent 
rise of a pro-reform faction – may help to explain why the Vietnamese Constitution 
evinces deeper normative commitments than its Chinese counterpart.  
Though abuses persist, Vietnamese leaders have been more receptive to 
incorporating international best practices, especially in the field of human rights. 
Human rights received constitutional recognition in the Vietnamese Constitution of 
1992, twelve years before it was added via amendment to the Chinese Constitution in 
2004.
88
 Prior to that, Vietnam ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1982.
89
 Article 70(14) of the 2013 Constitution mentions 
a general commitment to international human rights treaties and fundamental citizens’ 
rights,
90
 while Article 31 showcases a commitment to human rights norms vis-à-vis 
the practice of criminal justice at a level of detail matched by few national 
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constitutions in such detail.
91
 The partial entrenchment of the ICCPR has the 
potential to open the door for further reform. Whereas the Basic Laws of Hong Kong 
and Macau incorporate the ICCPR,
92
 it remains wishful thinking on behalf of Chinese 
constitutional scholars to entrench such core rights in the national Constitution. China 
signed the ICCPR 16 years after Vietnam and has yet to ratify it.
93
 This may have 
practical effect. Vietnam appears relatively more committed to reforming use of the 
death penalty. It abolished execution by firing squad in favor of legal injection more 
decisively than China.
94
 Extraordinarily, in 2007 Vietnam abstained from the UN 
resolution calling for a global moratorium on execution with the ultimate goal of 
abolishing the death penalty, effectively making Vietnam the only Asian retentionist 
country which did not object to the resolution.
95
  
 
IV. Responsiveness to Civil Society and Public Demands 
Party-states must be responsive to popular will to ensure regime survival and 
political stability. While the promotion of rule of law generates further demand for 
rights in both countries, their limited legal systems are hard pressed to meet the 
challenges brought by massive socioeconomic transition due to a lack of capacity and 
credibility. The Party-states must directly face those challenges and may at times 
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choose to supplement or subvert the legal systems they have created. Chinese and 
Vietnamese constitutional practice therefore necessitates a responsive and proactive 
state, based on political expedience rather established legal rules, in managing and 
coordinating popular demand for rights and interests. The Vietnamese Party-state 
appears to be situated in a “better” (i.e., less defensive) posture than its Chinese 
counterpart, as the Vietnamese order is more tolerant of input from a more 
autonomous civil society. Indeed, some Vietnamese politicians have called for an 
event more resilient civil society.
96
 Nonetheless, both systems often fail to meet such 
demands, resulting in extrajudicial action by the people themselves. 
Constitutionally, the people are the master of the state in China, and are the 
protector of the Constitution in Vietnam.
97
 Thus, a feasible theory of socialist 
constitutionalism demands that law reflect and reinforce popular will in both countries. 
Both the CCP and VCP have proven responsive (sometimes over-responsive) to 
popular demand, yet the Vietnamese Party-state is presently far more respectful of 
voices from civil society than its Chinese counterpart. That Vietnam would possess a 
more structured and vibrant public sphere is consistent with Vietnam’s higher degree of 
political pluralism and deeper commitment to international norms. It boasts a healthier 
interface between the Party-state and civil society, as evinced by: (1) a more activist 
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labor sector, (2) a more vibrant religious community, and (3) a more independent 
lawyers’ bar association. On the contrary, the Chinese Party-state, in comparison, has 
been more decisive and harsh in cracking down on civil organizations and silencing 
dissenting voices. 
(i) Labor 
Labor unions in both countries are dominated by their respective communist 
parties and serve a “transmission belt” of intelligence.98 Faithful to their ideological 
roots, both constitutions devote special attention to protect the rights of the toiling 
people. For example, Chinese workers enjoy constitutional rights to work and rest.
99
 
In that sense, the Chinese Constitution is nominal, but its constitutional provisions are 
not fully implemented due to the lack of resources and issues of implementation. The 
Vietnamese Constitution, meanwhile, grants constitutional status to a Trade Union 
intended to protect workers’ rights.100 In practice, Vietnam’s labor relations regime 
more closely tracks ILO standards. For example, Vietnamese labor law includes a 
National Wage Council modeled on a South Korean example with technical assistance 
from ILO. Composed of members from the government, unions and business 
associations, that tripartite body has been effective in advising decision-makers on 
minimum wages.
101
 Vietnam is thus ahead of China in legalizing industrial action. 
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 Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung approved Decree 49/2013/ND-CP, which 
commissioned the establishment of a National Wage Council to oversee national wage levels 
These developments may come in handy, as both countries experience interest-based 
industrial action and mass strikes that are likely to increase in size and frequency.
102
 
The Vietnamese labor law has long authorized strikes under certain 
circumstances, although those conditions are hard to fulfill,
103
 while unions and 
professional organizations, in spite of their dependence on the VCP, can be relatively 
more spontaneous and representative than their Chinese counterparts in representing 
workers’ interests against both the state and employers.104 For example, a significant 
difference between the two countries is that an enterprise union chair is paid for by 
unions at the next higher level in Vietnam, while their Chinese counterpart is paid for 
by the very enterprise the union chair serves.
105
 This openness reflects the historical 
fact that Vietnamese unions are more politically powerful in dealing with employers 
and structurally more autonomous of the VCP than their Chinese counterpart, the 
ACFTU.
106
  
The relative strength of Vietnamese workers is also reflected in the fact that, 
despite the large number of illegal wildcat strikes in Vietnam, few organizers have 
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been prosecuted (although private harassment does occur).
107
 While there is a legal 
procedure for the government to petition courts for a declaration that a strike is illegal, 
the government has never utilized it. Instead, the dismissal of a striker often leads to 
renewed strikes forcing management to reinstate the dismissed workers.
108
 As Simon 
Clarke points out, official tolerance of such strikes provides the most powerful 
incentive for Vietnamese workers to achieve what they want through extra-legal 
means.
109
 In Khanh’s view, an over-responsive state thus “has given rise to a negative 
precedent, making workers believe compliance with the official mechanism for 
collective labour dispute resolution is unnecessary.”110  
(ii) Religion 
The relative open space for religion also reflects a more resilient and rigorous 
demand for religious freedom in Vietnamese society. The VCP does not prohibit its 
members from exploring religious beliefs as the CCP does, as long as the religion is 
properly recognized by the state.
111
 It has not created a parallel Catholic Church 
independent of Rome, as the CCP has done; it does not force its Catholics renounce 
allegiance to the Vatican, as the CCP does; and it does not ordain bishops who are not 
endorsed by the Vatican, as the CCP does, even though it does from time to time veto 
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the Vatican’s recommended candidates. 112  Where restriction and repression 
undoubtedly continue in Vietnam, the CCP has been far less permissive.   
With the general improvement of relations between Vietnam and the Vatican, 
Vietnamese religious groups maintain stronger ties with foreign countries. While both 
Party-states impose strong bureaucratic control over religious organizations, 
Vietnamese believers are allowed practice their faith with greater confidence in the 
open: they can be registered as independent religious organizations with the 
government and thereby authorized to operate legitimately “on the ground” in parallel 
with directly state-controlled religious organizations. In China, no independent 
religious groups can exist legally outside of direct state control. They are either 
incorporated into the state-controlled institutions or operate as house-churches in the 
long shadow of the state, suffering routine harassment and crackdown.
113
  
The VCP started to loosen its grip over religious organizations and practices in 
1990, and one key development was to accept and tolerate Party members from 
religious communities.
114
 The removal of religious ban on Party members was a 
recognition and reflection of the importance of religion in the Vietnamese society and 
contributed to the creation of a more vibrant religious community that cuts across the 
Party-state and society boundaries.
115
 The participation of VCP members in religious 
activities legitimizes religion in general, opens a space for interaction between the 
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state and the religious sector and, makes the police harassment less likely for the 
faithful. This difference in whether Party members may practice religion may help to 
explain why Vietnamese believers practice largely “on the ground” while their 
Chinese counterparts do so “underground.”    
     
(iii) The Legal Profession 
Legal professionals are active in both countries in holding the Party-state 
accountable to its rule of law rhetoric, despite tight government control over lawyers, 
firms and bar associations.
116
 Lawyers in both nations are endeavoring to achieve a 
degree of autonomy from government control but are met with a swift and harsh 
response, with leading lawyers selectively prosecuted for sedition, subversion or other 
offences.
117
 Yet, ad hoc evidence indicates that while Chinese rights lawyers are at 
least as zealous as their Vietnamese counterparts, their representative professional 
organizations are more timid.
118
  
While the sheer size of the legal profession is much smaller in Vietnam than in 
China,
119
 the phenomena of “die-hard lawyers” vigorously challenging the 
prosecution’s cases (on largely procedural matters) began in Vietnam at least as early 
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as 2003,
120
 several years before it was celebrated in China. Meanwhile, the CCP is 
more aggressive at penetrating and controlling organized challenges from the legal 
profession while the VCP appears relatively more tolerant of their institutional 
autonomy. Vietnam’s National Bar Association has little control over regional and 
local bar associations, as the latter openly challenge the former’s lack of autonomy 
from the government.
121
 The Ho Chi Minh City Bar Association, in particular, is 
much more active than its Chinese counterparts in seeking autonomy from regulators 
and is more responsive to the interests of its members when in conflict with the 
government.
122
 Of course, whether stronger challenges from better organized lawyers’ 
organizations will directly lead to deeper political reform and a more credible 
commitment to rule of law is hard to predict.  
Both Party-states engage in the arrest and harassment of individual defense 
lawyers who take on politically sensitive cases. Le Cong Dinh, a Western-trained 
lawyer who won a major WTO case for Vietnam was imprisoned from 2009 to 2013 
and then disbarred for defending dissidents and bloggers.
123
 In 2011, Cu Huy Ha Vu 
was sentenced to seven years in prison for filing lawsuits against the prime minister 
and defending clients which included a Roman Catholic parish.
124
 But the scale and 
severity of repression against human rights lawyers in China has been far worse, as 
amply demonstrated by the 2015 crackdown resulting in criminal conviction and 
administrative punishment of dozens of lawyers.
125
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The persistent question thus remains whether a Party-state will rely on the formal 
legal system to resolve disputes according to proper procedures, or resort to repression 
or other unprincipled informal mechanisms based on political expedience? As 
numerous studies have shown, unprincipled dispute resolution that bypasses the legal 
system eventually exacerbates social conflict and becomes a destabilizing factor unto 
itself.
126
 There is indeed an emerging consensus among political elites that dispute 
resolution based on the rule of law and predictable legal principles is the most 
cost-effective way to resolve the vast majority of the cases.
127
  
When discourse signals a constitutional commitment on the part of the 
Party-state, citizens in both nations have responded by seizing that discourse. 
Constitutional rhetoric gives space for articulation and action by civil society, and has 
inspired people to fight for them even in authoritarian states. The gap between a high 
normative standard of constitutional rights and low levels of practical enforcement 
sharpens the contrast between entitlement and reality, creating further incentives and 
opportunities for mobilization. It is commonly agreed that rights-awareness has been 
on the rise steadily with political and legal consequences in both countries,
128
 and 
aware citizens invariably demand to exercise those rights through available institutions. 
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If those institutions fail to deliver, people will create or resort to non-institutional fora 
for remedies. Ultimately, the authoritarian Party-state’s flirtation with rule of law is a 
double-edged sword which has been wielded with great caution, mindful of law’s 
inherent threat to authoritarian rule.  
V. Conclusion 
Constitutional rights are alive in people’s esteem in both China and Vietnam as 
grass-root constitutional demands unfold on a daily basis. While judicial construction 
is severely constrained, citizens actively interpret and implement constitutional rights 
in forums across both countries including streets, factories, churches and classrooms. 
This Chapter conceptualized similarities and differences between three substantive 
foundations of constitutional practices in both states, i.e., the leadership of the 
communist party, faith in developing a socialist rule of law, and requisite state 
responsiveness to popular will.  
Regime survival is the ultimate goal for any single party which desires to 
perpetuate its command of power. The Party-state model is adapting to new 
circumstances and continues to evolve incrementally to develop and defend its 
credibility and legitimacy. One core strategy is reliance upon legal rules to discipline 
the state and impose order in society. Ultimately, rule of law is a double-edged sword 
which the Party-state must wield with great caution, mindful of law’s inherent, 
potential threat to authoritarian rule. While the Party-state purposively maintains a 
weak legal system to satisfy its own political agenda, a weak system cannot contain 
the socioeconomic problems it is designed to resolve. Resort to extra-judicial fora 
undermines the state’s legal system while delegating some degree of constitutional 
enforcement to the people.   
Both constitutional orders are presently locked in a cycle of mobilization and 
counter-mobilization in which societal forces demand change which the Party-state 
considers, manages, and occasionally, concedes. This requires the Party to constantly 
balance its position against popular action pushing for a redistribution of interests or 
incremental change, while the legal system attempts to impose a degree of regularity. 
Where civil society is consulted, that process is likely to go more smoothly and with 
less resistance then in soil where even nascent organized civil society is resisted. The 
Sino-Vietnamese comparison indicates that the limits of the Chinese experiment with 
constitutionally-based legal reform over the past several decades seem to have 
hardened, at least for the time being. While China and Vietnam may share common 
constraints, the scope for depth of reform appears deeper in Vietnam, whose system 
currently possesses the advantages of being more open and receptive to new ideas, 
both internal and external in origin. Thus, the “socialism with Vietnamese 
characteristics” outlined herein may allow the Vietnamese Party-state to rejuvenate 
itself while overcoming some of the institutional barriers that have stalled reform in 
China.     
